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Abstract
We prove that, assuming the exponential time hypothesis, finding an ǫ-approximately
optimal signaling scheme in a two-player zero-sum game requires quasi-polynomial time
(nΩ˜(lgn)). This is tight by [8] and resolves an open question of Dughmi [13]. We also
prove that finding a multiplicative approximation is NP-hard.
We also introduce a new model where a dishonest signaler may publicly commit to use
one scheme, but post signals according to a different scheme. For this model, we prove
that even finding a (1− 2−n)-approximately optimal scheme is NP-hard.
1 Introduction
Many classical questions in economics involve extracting information from strategic agents.
Lately, there has been growing interest within algorithmic game theory in signaling: the study
of how to reveal information to strategic agents (see e.g. [17, 14, 15, 13, 8] and references
therein). Signaling has been studied in many interesting economic and game theoretic settings.
Among them, Zero-Sum Signaling proposed by Dughmi [13] stands out as a canonical
problem that cleanly captures the computational nature of signaling. In particular, focusing
on zero-sum games clears away issues of equilibrium selection and computational tractability
of finding an equilibrium.
Definition 1.1 (Zero-Sum Signaling [13]). Alice and Bob play a Bayesian zero-sum game
where the payoff matrix M is drawn from a publicly known prior. The signaler Sam pri-
vately observes the state of nature (i.e. the payoff matrix), and then publicly broadcasts a
signal ϕ (M) to both Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob Bayesian-update their priors according
to ϕ (M)’s and play the Nash equilibrium of the expected game; but they receive payoffs
according to the true M . Sam’s goal is to design an efficient signaling scheme ϕ (a function
from payoff matrices to strings) that maximizes Alice’s expected payoff.
Dughmi’s [13] main result proves that assuming the hardness of the Planted Clique
problem, there is no additive FPTAS for Zero-Sum Signaling. The main open question
left by [13] is whether there exists an additive PTAS. Here we answer this question in the
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negative: we prove that assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) [16], obtaining an
additive-ǫ-approximation (for some constant ǫ > 0) requires quasi-polynomial time (nΩ˜(lgn)).
This result is tight thanks to a recent quasi-polynomial (n
lg n
poly(ǫ) ) time algorithm by Cheng et
al. [8]. Another important advantage of our result is that it replaces the hardness of Planted
Clique with a more believable worst-case hardness assumption (see e.g. the discussion in [7]).
Theorem 1.2 (Main Result). There exists a constant ǫ > 0, such that assuming ETH,
approximating Zero-Sum Signaling with payoffs in [−1, 1] to within an additive ǫ requires
time nΩ˜(lgn).
Using a similar construction, we also obtain NP-hardness for computing a multiplicative-
(1− ǫ)-approximation. Unfortunately, in our example Alice can receives both negative and
positive payoffs, which is somewhat non-standard (but not unprecedented [9]) in multiplica-
tive approximation. One main reason that multiplicative approximation with negative payoffs
is problematic is that this is often trivially intractable for any finite factor: Start with a tiny
additive gap, where Alice’s expected payoff is c in the “yes” case, and s = c − ǫ in the
“no” case; subtract (c+ s) /2 from all of Alice’s payoffs to obtain an infinite multiplicative
hardness. We note, however, that the combination of negative and positive payoffs in our
construction serves only to obtain structural constraints on the resulting equilibria; the hard-
ness of approximation is not a result of cancellation of negative with positive payoffs: Alice’s
payoff can be decomposed as a difference of non-negative payoffs U = U+ − U−, such that
it is hard to approximate Alice’s optimal payoff to within ǫ · E [U+ + U−]. Nevertheless, we
believe that extending this result to non-negative payoffs could be very interesting.
Theorem 1.3. There exists a constant ǫ > 0, such that it is NP-hard to approximate Zero-
Sum Signaling to within a multiplicative (1− ǫ) factor.
Finally, we note that since all our games are zero-sum, the hardness results for Zero-
Sum Signaling also apply to the respective notions of additive- and multiplicative-ǫ-Nash
equilibrium.
1.1 The computational complexity of lying
As a motivating example, consider the purchase of a used car (not a zero-sum game, but a
favorite setting in the study of signaling since Akerlof’s seminal “Market for Lemons” [2]),
and let us focus on the information supplied by a third party such as a mechanic inspection.
The mechanic (Sam) publishes a signaling scheme: report any problem found in a one-hour
inspection. Unbeknownst to the buyer (Bob), the mechanic favors the seller (Alice), and
chooses to use a different signaling scheme: always report that the car is in excellent condition.
Notice that it is crucial that the buyer does not know that the mechanic is lying (and more
generally, we assume that neither party knows that the signaler is lying).
Much of the work in economics is motivated by selfish agents manipulating their private
information. Here we introduce a natural extension of Dughmi’s signaling model, where the
signaler manipulates his private information. We formalize this extension in the Zero-Sum
Lying problem, where the signaling scheme consists of two functions ϕalleged (“report any
problem found”) and ϕreal (“car is in excellent condition”) from payoff matrices to signals.
Sam promises Alice and Bob to use ϕalleged, which is what Alice and Bob use to compute
the posterior distribution given the signal (i.e. the seller and buyer look at the mechanic’s
report and negotiate a price as if the state of the car is correctly reflected). But instead Sam
signals according to ϕreal.
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We formally define the Zero-Sum Lying problem below; notice that the original Zero-
Sum Signaling (Definition 1.1) corresponds to the special case where we restrict ϕreal =
ϕalleged.
Definition 1.4 (Zero-Sum Lying). Alice and Bob play a Bayesian, one-shot, zero-sum
game where the payoff matrix is drawn from a publicly known prior. A dishonest signaling
scheme consists of two (possibly randomized) functions ϕalleged, ϕreal from payoff matrices
to signals, that induce the following protocol:
• Nature draws a private payoff matrix M ∼ Dnature.
• Alice and Bob observe the scheme ϕalleged and the signal σ , ϕreal (M). (But they
don’t know the scheme ϕreal!)
• Alice and Bob choose a Nash equilibrium (x;y) for the zero-sum game with payoff
matrix E [M ′ | ϕalleged (M ′) = σ]1.
– (We assume that the support of ϕreal is contained in the support of ϕalleged.)
• Alice and Bob receive payoffs x⊤My and −x⊤My, respectively.
Sam’s goal is to compute a pair (ϕalleged, ϕreal) that maximizes Alice’s expected payoff.
In the toy-setting of a biased car inspection, the Sam’s optimal strategy was very simple.
In contrast, we show that for a general distribution over zero-sum games, it is NP-hard to find
a pair (ϕalleged, ϕreal) that is even remotely close to optimal. Notice that this is very different
from the honest case where, as we mentioned earlier, NP-hardness of additive approximation
is unlikely given the additive quasi-PTAS of [8].
Theorem 1.5. Approximating Zero-Sum Lying with Alice’s payoffs in [0, 1] to within an
additive (1− 2−n) is NP-hard.
Further discussion of dishonest signaling
It is important to note that the dishonest signaling model has a few weaknesses:
• Alice and Bob must believe the dishonest signaler. (See also further discussion below.)
• In particular, Sam cheats in favor of Alice, but Alice doesn’t know about it — so what’s
in it for Sam? Indeed, we assume that Sam has some intrinsic interest in Alice winning,
e.g. because Sam loves Alice or owns some of her stocks.
• The game for which players’ strategies are at equilibrium may be very different from
the actual game. Note, however, that this is also the case for the honest signaling model
(when the signaling scheme is not one-to-one).
• The players may receive different payoffs for different equilibria; this may raise issues
of equilibrium selection.
1When ϕalleged, ϕreal are randomized, we have σ ∼ ϕreal (M) and expectation conditioned on
E [M ′ | σ ∼ ϕalleged (M
′)].
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Despite those disadvantages, we believe that our simple model is valuable because it already
motivates surprising results such as our Theorem 1.5. On a higher level, we hope that it will
inspire research on many other interesting aspects on dishonest signaling. For example, notice
that in our model Sam lies without any reservation; if, per contra, the game was repeated
infinitely many times, one would expect that Alice and Bob will eventually stop believing
the signals, hence only honest signaling is possible. There is also a spectrum of intermediate
situations, where Alice and Bob observe some partial information about past games (e.g.
marginal distribution of signals) and may encounter questions about distribution testing.
Another related direction of potential future research is to think about Sam’s incentives.
When is honest signaling optimal for Sam? When is it approximately optimal? How should
one design an effective “punishing” mechanism?
1.2 Concurrent work of Bhaskar et al.
In independent concurrent work by Bhaskar et al. [5], quasi-polynomial time hardness for
additive approximation of Zero-Sum Signaling was obtained assuming the hardness of the
Planted Clique problem (among other interesting results2 about network routing games
and security games). Although we are not aware of a formal reduction, hardness of Planted
Clique is a qualitatively stronger assumption than ETH in the sense that it requires average
case instances to be hard. Hence in this respect, our result is stronger.
1.3 Techniques
Our main ingredient for the quasi-polynomial hardness is the technique of “birthday repeti-
tion” coined by [1] and recently applied in game theoretic settings in [7, 4, 11]: We reduce
from a 2-ary constraint satisfaction problem (2-CSP) over n variables to a distribution over
N zero-sum N × N games, with N = 2Θ(
√
n). Alice and Bob’s strategies correspond to
assignments to tuples of
√
n variables. By the birthday paradox, the two
√
n-tuples chosen
by Alice and Bob share a constraint with constant probability. If a constant fraction of the
constraints are unsatisfiable, Alice’s payoff will suffer with constant probability. Assuming
ETH, approximating the value of the CSP requires time 2Ω˜(n) = N Ω˜(lgN).
The challenge The main difficulty is that once the signal is public, the zero-sum game is
tractable. Thus we would like to force the signaling scheme to output a satisfying assignment.
Furthermore, if the scheme would output partial assignments on different states of nature (aka
different zero-sum games in the support), it is not clear how to check consistency between
different signals. Thus we would like each signal to contain an entire satisfying assignment.
The optimal scheme may be very complicated and even require randomization, yet by an
application of the Caratheodory Theorem the number of signals is, wlog, bounded by the
number of states of nature [13]. If the state of nature can be described using only lgN =
Θ˜ (
√
n) bits3, how can we force the scheme to output an entire assignment?
To overcome this obstacle, we let the state of nature contain a partial assignment to a
random
√
n-tuple of variables. We then check the consistency of Alice’s assignment with
nature’s assignment, Bob’s assignment with nature’s assignment, and Alice and Bob’s assign-
ments with each other; let τA,Z , τB,Z , τA,B denote the outcomes of those consistency checks,
2For zero-sum games, Bhaskar et al. also rule out an additive FPTAS assuming P 6= NP. This result follows
immediately from our Theorem 4.1.
3In other words, N , the final size of the reduction, is an upper bound on the number of states of nature.
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respectively. Alice’s payoff is given by:
U = δτA,Z − δ2τB,Z + δ3τA,B
for some small constant δ ∈ (0, 1). Now, both Alice and Bob want to maximize their chances
of being consistent with nature’s partial assignment, and the signaling scheme gains by max-
imizing τA,B.
Of course, if nature outputs a random assignment, we have no reason to expect that it
can be completed to a full satisfying assignment. Instead, the state of nature consists of N
assignments, and the signaling scheme helps Alice and Bob play with the assignment that
can be completed.
Several other obstacles arise; fortunately some can be handled using techniques from
previous works on hardness of finding Nash equilibrium [3, 10, 4].
2 Preliminaries
Exponential Time Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1 (Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) [16]). 3SAT takes time 2Ω(n).
PCP Theorem and CSP
Definition 2.1 (2CSP). 2-CSP (2-ary Constraint Satisfaction Problem) is a maximization
problem. The input is a graph G = (V,E), alphabet Σ, and a constraint Ce ⊆ Σ × Σ for
every e ∈ E.
The output is a labeling ϕ : V → Σ of the vertices. Given a labeling, we say that a
constraint (or edge) (u, v) ∈ E is satisfied if ϕ (u) , ϕ (v) ∈ C(u,v). The value of a labeling
is the fraction of e ∈ E that are satisfied by the labeling. The value of the instance is the
maximum fraction of constraints satisfied by any assignment.
Theorem 2.2 (PCP Theorem [12]; see e.g. [6, Theorem 2.11] for this formulation). Given a
3SAT instance φ of size n, there is a polynomial time reduction that produces a 2CSP instance
ψ, with size |ψ| = n ·polylogn variables and constraints, and constant alphabet size, such that:
Completeness If φ is satisfiable, then so is ψ.
Soundness If φ is not satisfiable, then at most a (1− η)-fraction of the constraints in ψ can
be satisfied, for some η = Ω(1).
Balance Every variable in ψ participates in exactly d = O (1) constraints.
Finding a good partition
Lemma 2.3 (Essentially [4, Lemma 6]). Let G = (V,E) be a d-regular graph and n , |V |.
We can partition V into n/k disjoint subsets
{
S1, . . . , Sn/k
}
of size at most 2k such that:
∀i, j |(Si × Sj) ∩ E| ≤ 8d2k2/n (1)
Proof. We assign vertices to subsets iteratively, and show by induction that we can always
maintain (1) and the bound on the subset size. Since the average set size is less than k, we
have by Markov’s inequality that at each step less than half of the subsets are full. The next
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vertex we want to assign, v, has neighbors in at most d subsets. By our induction hypothesis,
each Si is of size at most 2k, so on average over j ∈ [n/k], it has less than 4dk2/n neighbors
in each Sj. Applying Markov’s inequality again, Si has at least 8d
2k2/n neighbors in less
than a (1/2d)-fraction of subsets Sj. In total, we ruled out less than half of the subsets for
being full, and less than half of the subsets for having too many neighbors with subsets that
contain neighbors of v. Therefore there always exists some subset Si to which we can add v
while maintaining the induction hypothesis.
How to catch a far-from-uniform distribution
The following lemma due to [10] implies that
Lemma 2.4 (Lemma 3 in the full version of [10]). Let {ai}ni=1 be real numbers satisfying the
following properties for some θ > 0: (1) a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an; (2)
∑
ai = 0; (3)
∑n/2
i=1 ai ≤ θ.
Then
∑n
i=1 |ai| ≤ 4θ.
3 Additive hardness
Theorem 3.1. There exists a constant ǫ > 0, such that assuming ETH, approximating Zero-
Sum Signaling with payoffs in [−1, 1] to within an additive ǫ requires time nΩ˜(lgn).
Construction overview
Our reduction begins with a 2CSP ψ over n variables from alphabet Σ. We partition the
variables into n/k disjoint subsets
{
S1, . . . , Sn/k
}
, each of size at most 2k for k =
√
n such
that every two subsets share at most a constant number of constraints.
Nature chooses a random subset Si from the partition, a random assignment ~u ∈ Σ2k to
the variables in Si, and an auxiliary vector bˆ ∈ {0, 1}Σ×[2k]. As mentioned in Section 1.3, ~u
may not correspond to any satisfying assignment. Alice and Bob participate in one of |Σ|2k
subgames; for each ~v ∈ Σ2k, there is a corresponding subgame where all the assignments are
XOR-ed with ~v. The goal of the auxiliary vector bˆ is to force Alice and Bob to participate in
the right subgame, i.e. the one where the XOR of ~v and ~u can be completed to a full satisfying
assignment. In particular, the optimum signaling scheme reveals partial information about
bˆ in a way that guides Alice and Bob to participate in the right subgame. The scheme also
outputs the full satisfying assignment, but reveals no information about the subset Si chosen
by nature.
Each player has
(
|Σ|2k × 2
)
×
(
n/k × ( n/k
n/2k
)× |Σ|2k
)
= 2Θ(
√
n) strategies. The first
|Σ|2k strategies correspond to a Σ-ary vector ~v that the scheme will choose after observing
the random input. The signaling scheme forces both players to play (w.h.p.) the strategy
corresponding to ~v by controlling the information that corresponds to the next 2 strategies.
Namely, for each ~v′ ∈ Σ2k, there is a random bit b (~v′) such that each player receives a payoff
of 1 if they play (~v′, b (~v′)) and 0 for (~v′, 1− b (~v′)). The b’s are part of the state of nature,
and the optimal signaling scheme will reveal only the bit corresponding to the special ~v. Since
there are |Σ|2k bits, nature cannot choose them independently, as that would require 2|Σ|2k
states of nature. Instead we construct a pairwise independent distribution.
The next n/k strategies correspond to the choice of a subset Si from the specified partition
of variables. The
( n/k
n/2k
)
strategies that follow correspond to a gadget due to Althofer [3]
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whereby each player forces the other player to randomize (approximately) uniformly over the
choice of subset.
The last |Σ|2k strategies correspond to an assignment to Si. The assignment to each Si
is XOR-ed entry-wise with ~v. Then, the players are paid according to checks of consistency
between their assignments, and a random assignment to a random Si picked by nature.
(The scheme chooses ~v so that nature’s random assignment is part of a globally satisfying
assignment.) Each player wants to pick an assignment that passes the consistency check with
nature’s assignment. Alice also receives a small bonus if her assignment agrees with Bob’s;
thus her payoff is maximized when there exists a globally satisfying assignment.
Formal construction
Let ψ be a 2CSP-d over n variables from alphabet Σ, as guaranteed by Theorem 2.2. In
particular, ETH implies that distinguishing between a completely satisfiable instance and
(1− η)-satisfiable requires time 2Ω˜(n). By Lemma 2.3, we can (deterministically and effi-
ciently) partition the variables into n/k subsets
{
S1, . . . , Sn/k
}
of size at most 2k = 2
√
n,
such that every two subsets share at most 8d2k2/n = O (1) constraints.
States of nature Nature chooses a state
(
bˆ, i, ~u
)
∈ {0, 1}Σ×[2k]× [n/k]×Σ2k uniformly at
random. For each ~v, b (~v) is the XOR of bits from bˆ that correspond to entries of ~v:
∀~v ∈ Σ2k b (~v) ,

 ⊕
(σ,ℓ) : [~v]ℓ=σ
[
bˆ
]
(σ,ℓ)

 .
Notice that the b (~v)’s are pairwise independent and each marginal distribution is uniform
over {0, 1}.
Strategies Alice and Bob each choose a strategy (~v, c, j, T, ~w) ∈ Σ2k × {0, 1} × [n/k] ×([n/k]
n/2k
)×Σ2k. We use ~vA, cA, etc. to denote the strategy Alice plays, and similarly ~vB , cB , etc.
for Bob. For σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, we denote σ ⊕Σ σ′ , σ + σ′ (mod |Σ|), and for vectors ~v,~v′ ∈ Σ2k,
we let ~v ⊕Σ ~v′ ∈ Σ2k denote the entry-wise ⊕Σ. When ~vA = ~vB = ~v, we set τA,Z = 1
if assignments
(
~v ⊕Σ ~wA
)
and (~v ⊕Σ ~u) to subsets SjA and Si, respectively, satisfy all the
constraints in ψ that are determined by
(
Si ∪ SjA
)
, and τA,Z = 0 otherwise. Similarly,
τB,Z = 1 iff
(
~v ⊕Σ ~wB
)
and (~v ⊕Σ ~u) satisfy the corresponding constraints in ψ; and τA,B
checks
(
~v ⊕Σ ~wA
)
and
(
~v ⊕Σ ~wB
)
. When ~vA 6= ~vB , we set τA,Z = τB,Z = τA,B = 0.
Payoffs Given state of nature
(
bˆ, i, ~u
)
and players’ strategies
(
~vA, cA, jA, TA, ~wA
)
and(
~vB , cB , jB , TB, ~wB
)
, We decompose Alice’s payoff as:
UA , UAb + U
A
Althofer + U
A
ψ ,
where
UAb , 1
{
cA = b
(
~vA
)}− 1{cB = b (~vB)} ,
UAAlthofer , 1
{
jB ∈ TA}− 1{jA ∈ TB} ,
and
UAψ , δτ
A,Z − δ2τB,Z + δ3τA,B, (2)
for a sufficiently small constant 0 < δ ≪ √η.
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Completeness
Lemma 3.2. If ψ is satisfiable, there exists a signaling scheme and a mixed strategy for Alice
that guarantees expected payoff δ − δ2 + δ3.
Proof. Fix a satisfying assignment ~α ∈ Σn. Given state of nature
(
bˆ, i, ~u
)
, let ~v be such that
(~v ⊕Σ ~u) = [~α]Si . For each j ∈ [n/k], let ~βj be such that
(
~v ⊕Σ ~βj
)
= [~α]Sj . (Notice that
~βi = ~u.) The scheme outputs the signal
(
~v, b (~v) , ~β1, . . . ~βn/k
)
. Alice’s mixed strategy sets(
~vA, cA
)
= (~v, b (~v)), picks jA and TA uniformly at random, and sets ~wA = ~βjA .
Because Bob has no information about b (~v′) for any ~v′ 6= ~v, he has probability 1/2 of
losing whenever he picks ~vB 6= ~v, i.e. E [UAb
] ≥ 12 Pr
[
~vB 6= ~v]. Furthermore, because Alice
chooses TA and jA uniformly, E
[
UAAlthofer
]
= 0.
Since ~α completely satisfies ψ, we have that τA,Z = 1 as long as ~vB = ~v (regardless of
the rest of Bob’s strategy). Bob’s goal is thus to maximize E
[
δ2τB,Z − δ3τA,B]. Notice that(
~v ⊕Σ ~wA
)
and (~v ⊕Σ ~u) are two satisfying partial assignments to uniformly random subsets
from the partition. In particular, they are both drawn from the same distribution, so we have
that for any mixed strategy that Bob plays, E
[
τB,Z
]
= E
[
τA,B
]
. Therefore Alice’s payoff is
at least (
δ − δ2 + δ3)Pr [~vB = ~v]+ 1
2
Pr
[
~vB 6= ~v] ≥ δ − δ2 + δ3.
Soundness
Lemma 3.3. If at most a (1− η)-fraction of the constraints are satisfiable, Alice’s maxmin
payoff is at most δ − δ2 + (1− Ωη (1)) δ3, for any signaling scheme.
Proof. Fix any mixed strategy by Alice; we show that Bob can guarantee a payoff of at least
− (δ − δ2 + (1− Ωη (1)) δ3). On any signal, Bob chooses (~vB , cB) from the same distribution
that Alice uses for
(
~vA, cA
)
. He chooses jB uniformly, and picks TB so as to minimize
E
[
UAAlthofer
]
. Finally, for each jB , he draws ~wB from the same marginal distribution that
Alice uses for ~wA conditioning on jA = jB (and uniformly at random if Alice never plays
jA = jB). By symmetry, E
[
UAb
]
= 0 and E
[
UAAlthofer
] ≤ 0.
In this paragraph, we use Althoefer’s gadget to argue that, wlog, Alice’s distribution over
the choice of jA is approximately uniform. In Althofer’s gadget, Alice can guarantee an
(optimal) expected payoff of 0 by randomizing uniformly over her choice of jA and TA. By
Lemma 2.4, if Alice’s marginal distribution over the choice of jA is 8δ2-far from uniform (in
total variation distance), then Bob can guess that jA is in some subset TB ∈ ([n/k]
n/2k
)
with
advantage (over guessing at random) of at least 2δ2. Therefore E
[
UAAlthofer
] ≤ −2δ2; but
this would imply E
[
UA
] ≤ −2δ2 + E
[
UAψ
]
≤ δ − 2δ2 + δ3. So henceforth we assume wlog
that Alice’s marginal distribution over the choice of jA is O
(
δ2
)
-close to uniform (in total
variation distance).
Since Alice’s marginal distribution over jA is O
(
δ2
)
-close to uniform, we have that Bob’s
distribution over
(
jB , ~wB
)
is O
(
δ2
)
-close to Alice’s distribution over
(
jA, ~wA
)
. Therefore
E
[
τB,Z
] ≥ E [τA,Z]−O (δ2), and so we also get:
E
[
UA
] ≤ E [UAψ
] ≤ δ − δ2 + δ3E [τA,B]+O (δ4) . (3)
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Bounding E
[
τA,B
]
To complete the proof, it remains to show an upper bound on E
[
τA,B
]
.
In particular, notice that it suffices to bound the probability that Alice’s and Bob’s induced
assignments agree. Intuitively, if they gave assignments to uniformly random (and indepen-
dent) subsets of variables, the probability that their assignments agree cannot be much higher
than the value of the 2CSP; below we formalize this intuition.
By the premise, any assignment to all variables violates at least an η-fraction of the
constraints. In particular, this is true in expectation for assignments drawn according to
Alice’s and Bob’s mixed strategy. This is a bit subtle: in general, it is possible that Alice’s
assignment alone doesn’t satisfy many constraints and neither does Bob’s, but when we check
constraints between Alice’s and Bob’s assignments everything satisfied (for example, think of
the 3-Coloring CSP, where Alice colors all her vertices blue, and Bob colors all his vertices
red). Fortunately, this subtlety is irrelevant for our construction since we explicitly defined
Bob’s mixed strategy so that conditioned on each set Sj of variables, Alice and Bob have the
same distribution over assignments.
The expected number of violations between pairs directly depends on the value of the
2CSP. To bound the probability of observing at least one violations, recall that every pair
of subsets shares at most a constant number of constraints, so this probability is within a
constant factor of the expected number of violations. In particular, an Ω (η)-fraction of the
pairs of assignments chosen by Alice and Bob violate ψ.
Finally, Alice doesn’t choose jA uniformly at random; but her distribution is O
(
δ2
)
-close
to uniform. Therefore, we have E
[
τA,B
] ≤ 1 − Ω (η) + O (δ2). Plugging into (3) completes
the proof.
4 Multiplicative hardness
Theorem 4.1. There exists a constant ǫ > 0, such that it is NP-hard to approximate Zero-
Sum Signaling to within a multiplicative (1− ǫ) factor.
Construction overview
Our reduction begins with a 2CSP ψ over n variables from alphabet Σ.
Nature chooses a random index i ∈ [n], a random assignment u ∈ Σ for variable xi, and an
auxiliary vector ~b ∈ {0, 1}Σ. Notice that u may not correspond to any satisfying assignment.
Alice and Bob participate in one of |Σ| subgames; for each v ∈ Σ, there is a corresponding
subgame where all the assignments are XOR-ed with v. The optimum signaling scheme reveals
partial information about ~b in a way that guides Alice and Bob to participate in the subgame
where the XOR of v and u can be completed to a full satisfying assignment. The scheme also
outputs the full satisfying assignment, but reveals no information about the index i chosen
by nature.
Alice has (|Σ| × 2)× (n× n× |Σ|) = Θ (n2) strategies, and Bob has an additional choice
among n strategies (so Θ
(
n3
)
in total). The first |Σ| strategies correspond to a value v ∈ Σ
that the scheme will choose after observing the state of nature. The signaling scheme forces
both players to play (w.h.p.) the strategy corresponding to v by controlling the information
that corresponds to the next 2 strategies. Namely, for each v′ ∈ Σ, there is a random bit b (v′)
such that each player receives a small bonus if they play (v′, b (v′)) and not (v′, 1− b (v′)).
The b’s are part of the state of nature, and the signaling scheme will reveal only the bit
corresponding to the special v.
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The next n strategies correspond to a choice of a variable j ∈ [n]. The n strategies that
follow correspond to a hide-and-seek gadget whereby each player forces the other player to
randomize (approximately) uniformly over the choice of j. For Bob, the additional n strategies
induce a hide-and-seek game against nature, which serves to verify that the scheme does not
reveal too much information about the state of nature (this extra verification was unnecessary
in the reduction for additive inapproximability).
The last |Σ| strategies induce an assignment for xj. The assignment to each xj is XOR-
ed with v. Then, the players are paid according to checks of consistency between their
assignments, and a random assignment to a random xi picked by nature. (The scheme
chooses v so that nature’s random assignment is part of a globally satisfying assignment.)
Each player wants to pick an assignment that passes the consistency check with nature’s
assignment. Alice also receives a small bonus if her assignment agrees with Bob’s; thus her
payoff is maximized when there exists a globally satisfying assignment.
Formal construction
Let ψ be a 2CSP-d over n variables from alphabet Σ, as guaranteed by Theorem 2.2. In
particular, it is NP-hard to distinguish between ψ which is completely satisfiable, and one
where at most a (1− η)-fraction of the constraints can be satisfied. We denote (i, j) ∈ ψ if
there is a constraint over variables (xi, xj).
States of nature Nature chooses a state
(
~b, i, u
)
∈ {0, 1}Σ× [n]×Σ uniformly at random.
Strategies Alice chooses a strategy
(
vA, cA, jA, tA, wA
) ∈ Σ × {0, 1} × [n] × [n] × Σ, and
Bob chooses
(
vB , cB , jB , tB , qB , wB
) ∈ Σ×{0, 1}× [n]× [n]× [n]×Σ. For σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, we denote
σ⊕Σ σ′ , σ+ σ′ (mod |Σ|), and for a vector ~α ∈ Σn we let (σ ⊕Σ ~α) ∈ Σn denote the ⊕Σ of
σ with each entry of ~α. When vA = vB = v, we set τA,Z = 1 if ψ contains a constraint for
variables
(
jA, i
)
, and the assignments
(
v ⊕Σ wA
)
and (v ⊕Σ u) to those variables, respectively,
satisfy this constraint, and τA,Z = 0 otherwise. Similarly, τB,Z = 1 iff
(
v ⊕Σ wB
)
and (v ⊕Σ u)
satisfy a corresponding constraint in ψ; and τA,B checks
(
v ⊕Σ wA
)
with
(
v ⊕Σ wB
)
. When
vA 6= vB , we set τA,Z = τB,Z = τA,B = 0.
Payoffs Given players’ strategies
(
vA, cA, jA, tA, wA
)
and
(
vB , cB , jB , tB , qB , wB
)
and state
of nature
(
~b, i, u
)
, We decompose Alice’s payoff as:
UA , UAb + U
A
seek + U
A
ψ ,
where
UAb , 1
{
cA =
[
~b
]
vA
}
/n− 1
{
cB =
[
~b
]
vB
}
/n,
UAseek , 2 · 1
{
jB = tA
}− 1{jA = tB}− 1{i = qB} ,
and4
UAψ , δ
3τA,Z − δ4τB,Z + δ5τA,B,
for a sufficiently small constant 0 < δ ≪ √η.
4We use δ3τA,Z − δ4τB,Z + δ5τA,B instead of δ1τA,Z − δ2τB,Z + δ3τA,B as in 2, because the square of the
first coefficient appears in the proof. We have
(
δ3
)2
≪ δ5, but δ2 ≫ δ3.
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Completeness
Lemma 4.2. If ψ is satisfiable, there exists a signaling scheme, such that for every signal s
in the support, Alice can guarantee an expected payoff of dn
(
δ3 − δ4 + δ5).
Notice that the for every signal in the support qualification is different than the corre-
sponding Lemma 3.2 (and there is a similar difference between Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 3.3).
Indeed, this is stronger than we need for proving Theorem 4.1, but will come handy in Section
5.
Proof. Fix a satisfying assignment ~α ∈ Σn. Given state of nature
(
bˆ, i, u
)
, let v be such that
(v ⊕Σ u) = [~α]i, and let ~β be such that
(
v ⊕Σ ~β
)
= ~α. (Notice that
[
~β
]
i
= u.) The scheme
outputs the signal s ,
(
v,~bv , ~β
)
. Alice’s mixed strategy sets
(
vA, cA
)
=
(
v,~bv
)
; picks jA
and tA uniformly at random; and sets wA =
[
~β
]
jA
.
Because Bob has no information about
[
~b
]
v′
for any v′ 6= v, he has probability 1/2 of
losing whenever he picks vB 6= v, i.e. E [UAb | s
] ≥ 12n Pr
[
vB 6= v | s]. Furthermore, because
Alice and nature draw tA, jA and i uniformly at random, E
[
UAseek | s
]
= 0.
Since ~α completely satisfies ψ, we have that E
[
τA,Z | s] = Pr [(jA, i) ∈ ψ | s] = d/n,
as long as vB = v (regardless of the rest of Bob’s strategy). Bob’s goal is thus to maximize
E
[
δ4τB,Z − δ5τA,B | s]. However, since Alice’s assignment and nature’s assignment are drawn
from the same distribution, we have that for any mixed strategy Bob plays, E
[
τB,Z | s] =
E
[
τA,B | s]. Finally, since i is a uniformly random index (even when conditioning on s),
E
[
τB,Z | s] ≤ d/n. Therefore Alice’s payoff is at least
d
n
(
δ3 − δ4 + δ5)Pr [vB = v | s]+ 1
2n
Pr
[
vB 6= v | s] ≥ d
n
(
δ3 − δ4 + δ5) .
Soundness
Lemma 4.3. If at most a (1− η)-fraction of the constraints are satisfiable, then for any
signaling scheme and every signal s in the support, Alice’s maxmin payoff is at most
d
n
(
δ3 − δ4 + (1− Ω (1)) δ5).
Proof. On any signal, Bob chooses
(
vB , cB
)
from the same distribution that Alice uses
for
(
vA, cA
)
. He draws jB uniformly at random, and picks tB and qB so as to minimize
E
[
UAseek | s
]
. Finally, for each jB , Bob draws wB from the same distribution that Alice uses
for wA conditioning on jA = jB (and uniformly at random if Alice never plays jA = jB). By
symmetry, E
[
UAb | s
]
= 0 and E
[
UAseek | s
] ≤ 0.
Notice that
E
[
UAψ | s
] ≤ δ3 · Pr [(i, jA) ∈ ψ | s]+ δ5 · d
n
. (4)
We can assume wlog that Pr
[(
i, jA
) ∈ ψ | s] ≤ 3d/n. Otherwise, Bob can draw jˆA from the
same marginal distribution that Alice uses for jA, and set qB to a random ψ-neighbor of jˆA.
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This would imply Pr
[
i = qB | s] ≥ Pr [(i, jA) ∈ ψ | s] /d, and therefore
E
[
UAseek | s
] ≤ 2/n − Pr [(i, jA) ∈ ψ | s] /d
≤ −Pr [(i, jA) ∈ ψ | s] /3d
≤ −E [UAψ | s
]
,
in which case E
[
UA | s] ≤ 0. Therefore by (4), E
[
UAψ | s
]
≤ 4dδ3/n.
Furthermore, we claim that, conditioned on signal s, Alice’s optimal marginal distribution
over the choice of jA is O
(
δ3
)
-close to uniform (in total variation distance). Suppose by
contradiction that the distribution is 8dδ3-far from uniform. Then there exists some ℓ ∈ [n]
such that Pr
[
jA = ℓ | s] ≥ (1 + 4dδ3) /n. If Bob always plays tB = ℓ, then E [UAseek | s
] ≤
−4dδ3/n, and hence E [UA | s] ≤ 0.
Since Alice’s distribution over jA is O
(
δ3
)
-close to uniform, we have that Bob’s dis-
tribution over
(
jB , wB
)
is O
(
δ3
)
-close to Alice’s distribution over
(
jA, wA
)
. Therefore,
E
[
τB,Z | s] ≥ E [τA,Z | s]−O (δ3), so
E
[
δ3τA,Z − δ4τB,Z | s] ≤ (δ3 − δ4 +O (δ7)) · Pr [(i, jA) ∈ ψ | s]︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
n
(1+O(δ3))
≤ d
n
(
δ3 − δ4 +O (δ6))
We now upper bound E
[
τA,B | s]. By the premise, any assignment to all variables violates
at least an η-fraction of the constraints. In particular, this is true in expectation for assign-
ments drawn according to Alice’s and Bob’s mixed strategy. (Recall that we defined Bob’s
mixed strategy so that conditioned on each variable, Alice and Bob have the same distribution
over assignments). Therefore, since Alice’s marginal distribution over jA is O
(
δ3
)
-close to
uniform, we have that
E
[
τA,B | s] ≤ (1− Ω (η) +O (δ3)) · Pr [(jA, jB) ∈ ψ | s] ≤ d
n
(
1− Ω (η) +O (δ3)) .
Thus in total
E
[
UA | s] ≤ E [UAψ | s
] ≤ d
n
(
δ3 − δ4 + (1− Ω (η)) δ5 +O (δ6)) .
5 Lying is even harder
Theorem 5.1. Approximating Zero-Sum Lying with Alice’s payoffs in [0, 1] to within an
additive (1− 2−n) is NP-hard.
Construction
Consider the construction from Section 4 for the honest signaling problem. Lemmata 4.2 and
4.3 guarantee that there exists a distribution Dhonest of n×n zero-sum games and constants
c1 > c2 such that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following:
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Completeness If ψ is satisfiable, there exists a signaling scheme ϕhonest, such that for any
signal in ϕhonest’s support, Alice’s maxmin payoff is at least c1/n.
Soundness If ψ is (1− η)-unsatisfiable, for every signaling scheme ϕ′honest and every signal
in the support, Alice’s maxmin payoff is at most c2/n.
For Zero-Sum Lying, we construct a hard distribution of n × (n+ 1) zero-sum games as
follows. With probability 2−n Alice’s payoffs matrix is of the form:

 −A⊤honest
− (c1 + c2) /2n
...
− (c1 + c2) /2n

 , (5)
where Alice chooses a row (Bob chooses a column), and Ahonest is an n × n matrix drawn
from Dhonest. In other words, Bob has to choose between receiving payoff (c1 + c2) /2n, or
playing a game drawn from Dhonest, but with the roles reversed.
Otherwise (with probability 1 − 2−n), Alice’s payoff depends only on Bob: it is 1 if Bob
chooses any of his first n actions, and 0 otherwise; we call this the degenerate game.
Notice that we promised payoffs in [0, 1], whereas (5) has payoffs in [−1, 0]. [0, 1] pay-
offs can be obtained, without compromising the inapproximability guarantee, by scaling and
shifting the entries in (5) in a straightforward manner.
Completeness
Lemma 5.2. If ψ is satisfiable, there exists a dishonest signaling scheme, such that Alice’s
expected payoff is at least 1− 2−n.
Proof. We first construct ϕalleged as follows. Whenever nature samples a payoff matrix as in
(5), ϕalleged outputs the signal that ϕhonest would output for Ahonest. Whenever Alice and
Bob play the degenerate game, ϕalleged outputs a special symbol ⊥.
When Bob observes any symbol from the support of ϕhonest, he can guarantee a payoff
of c1/n > (c1 + c2) /2n by playing a mix of his first n strategies. Therefore he only uses his
last strategy when observing the special symbol ⊥.
Our true signaling scheme ϕreal always outputs an (arbitrary) signal from the support
of ϕhonest, regardless of the state of nature. With probability 1 − 2−n, Alice and Bob are
actually playing the degenerate game, so Alice’s payoff is 1.
Soundness
Lemma 5.3. If ψ is (1− η)-unsatisfiable, then for any dishonest signaling scheme(
ϕ
′
alleged, ϕ
′
real
)
, Alice’s expected payoff is negative.
Proof. Any signal in the support of ϕ
′
alleged corresponds to a mixture of the degenerate game,
and the distribution induced by some signal s
′
in the support of some honest signaling scheme
ϕ
′
honest for Dhonest. In the degenerate game, Bob always prefers to play his last strategy. For
any s
′
, Bob again prefers a payoff of (c1 + c2) /2n for playing his last strategy over a maxmin
of at most c2/n when playing any mixture of his first n strategies. Therefore, Bob always
plays his last strategy, regardless of the signal he receives, which guarantees him a payoff of
(c1 + c2) /2
n+1n > 0.
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